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ESSAY 
EXPLAINING GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER 
NEAL DEVINSt 
By approving race-conscious university admissions,' the Rehnquist 
Court echoed the opinions of Congress, the states, big business, aca-
demics, newspapers, and, to a lesser extent, the Bush administration.2 
In short, rather than join forces with the politically isolated opponents 
of affirmative action, the Court issued a ruling that conformed to so-
cial and political forces. For this reason, Gru,tter v. Bollinger was any-
thing but surprising. Like most constitutional rulings, Grutter com-
ported "with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking 
m,Yorities of the United States."3 Correspondingly, Grutter high-
lighted the pivotal role that elite opinion plays in shaping Court rul-
ings.4 Even though public opinion on affirmative action was mixed to 
1 Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and 
Mary. The inspiration for this Essay was a dinner conversation with Bill Van Alstyne. 
Bill's astute observations about the amicus filings in Grutter played an instrumental role 
in my decision to write this Essay. Special thanks are also owed to Phil Chapman for 
excellent research assistance and to Evan Benanti and his colleagues at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review for encouraging me to write this essay. Thanks, finally, to 
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Mark Graber, Rich Hynes, John McGinnis, Rick Pildes, Anne 
Sowers, and Bill Van Alstyne for commenting on a preliminary version of this Essay. 
1 Grutter v. Bollinger, I23 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
2 While the Bush Justice Department argued that both University of Michigan 
plans were unconstitutional, the President signaled to the Court that the White House 
would support a decision approving some form of race-conscious university admissions. 
See infra text accompanying notes II 0-13. 
3 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (I957). More recent scholarship has confirmed 
Dahl's thesis. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577 
(I993) (noting the potential for government decisions to reflect majority will as view-
points change); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the 
judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 71 (I993) (describing empirical studies that show 
that appointed justices often sustain majority opinions on social policy); Michael J. 
Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolution, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 
(1996) (questioning the assumption that the Justices will not consider a majoritarian 
opinion). 
4 See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT At'lD AMERICA.t'l POLITICS 216 
(347) 
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negative, economic and social leaders (who play a defining role in 
shaping the Court's reputation) overwhelmingly supported racial 
preferences.5 This Essay will highlight these social and political forces 
and, in so doing, explain why the Court had strong incentives to ap-
prove affirmative action.6 
This Essay will also explain why the same forces that underlie Grut-
ter also underlie Gratz v. Bollinger,' a companion case in which the 
Court rejected the University of Michigan's automatic awarding of a 
set number of points to all undergraduate minority applicants. By 
placing limits on how universities take race into account while approv-
ing the Law School's plan to treat race as a plus factor in "individual-
ized" admissions decisions,8 the Court recognized that support for af-
firmative action is qualified. Correspondingly, the Court's mixed 
decision allowed both the Bush administration and civil rights inter-
ests to rally around it. Finally, by disallowing one of the plans, the 
Court was able to portray itself as an independent check on govern-
ment without the fear of a majoritarian backlash. 
Grutter and Gratz, in other words, appear to be the work of a Court 
that maximizes its power by paying attention to the social and political 
forces that surround it. This depiction is directly at odds with recent 
depictions of the Rehnquist Court. By settling the 2000 presidential 
election and invalidating thirty-one federal laws between 1995 and 
2002, the Court has been characterized as "right-wing," "conservative," 
(2000) (discussing the Warren Court justices' differing perceptions on how to reach a 
majority opinion when they were setting the discrete and insular minority standard); 
Michael J. Klarman, What s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 145, 188-
94 (1998) (describing the influence of culturally elitist and countermajoritarian opin-
ions on the Court). 
5 See infra notes 93, 97-104, 108 (listing the amicus briefs submitted by economic 
and social leaders in Gruttuand Gratz). 
6 This is not to say that the Court's only choice was to approve one of the Univer-
sity of Michigan's affirmative action plans. As Justice Anthony Kennedy's dissenting 
opinion makes clear, the Court could have responded to majoritarian pressures by ap-
proving some race-conscious admissions while also invalidating both plans. See Grutter, 
123 S. Ct. at 2370 (Kennedy,]., dissenting); see also infra text accompanying note 146 
(providing additional discussion of a potential decision that would have garnered 
Kennedy's support). For reasons detailed in this Essay, however, the Court had strong 
incentives to uphold at least one of the two Michigan plans. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 147-51 (describing the surrounding social pressures). 
7 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003). 
8 See infra text accompanying note 153 (noting the Court's differentiation of the 
Jaw school plan that allowed for independent consideration of applicants and the col-
lege plan that considered "nonindividualized" factors). 
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"arrogant, self-aggrandizing, and unduly activist."!' Grutter and other 
progressive 2002 term decisions, such as Lawrence v. Texas, 10 were 
therefore dubbed as "surprising" and "counterintuitive."11 The "nor-
mally conservative high court" "upend[ed]" expectations by "play[ing] 
against type." 12 . 
The truth of the matter is that Grutter and other 2002-2003 term 
decisions follow the Rehnquist Court's practice of disappointing social 
conservatives. Eleven years ago, the Court dealt a seemingly fatal blow 
to the social conservative agenda by reaffirming both abortion rights 
under Roe v. Wade and banning school prayer under Engel v. Vitale. 13 
The decisions of the 2002-2003 term are very much in keeping with 
earlier Rehnquist Court rulings on race, religion, and privacy. Spe-
cifically, the same social and political forces that stood in the way of 
the Court's embrace of the social conservative agenda in 1992 remain 
a roadblock today. For the Rehnquist Court, Grutter is a testament to 
continuity, not change. 
Grutter, however, calls attention to how it is that the Supreme 
Court's identity is typically shaped by the Court's so-called swing Jus-
tices. On issues of social policy and federalism, Rehnquist Court deci-
sion making is largely defined by two Justices-Sandra Day O'Connor 
9 See Cass R. Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at A23 
(stating that "[w]e are now in the midst of a remarkable period ofright-wingjudicial 
activism"); Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise, It's an Activist Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, 
at A33 (arguing that "conservative judicial activism is the order of the day"); Suzanna 
Sherry, Irresponsibility Breeds Contempt, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 47, 47 (2002) (attributing accu-
sations of arrogance and self-aggrandizement to Court critics); see also Barry Friedman, 
Historicizing Constitutional Theory, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS 2 (forthcoming) (suggesting 
that scholars' writings about the Rehnquist Court are shaped by their ideological and 
political viewpoints). 
10 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (holding a Texas statute that criminalized same sex sex-
ual conduct was unconstitutional). 
11 See Linda Greenhouse, In a Momentous Term, justices Remake the Law, and the 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at Al (describing the Court's "surprising" decisions on 
affirmative action and homosexual rights as displaying "a new attentiveness" to cultural 
developments by "translating them into legal principle."); Tony Mauro, It's a Mad, 
Mad, Mad, Mad Court: justices Upended i'.xpectations in 2002-2003 Term, TEX. LAw., July 7, 
2003, at 12 (describing the Court decisions as a step back for conservatives). 
12 See David G. Savage, justices Take a Tum to the Left, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2003, at 
A1 (characterizing the Court as "normally conservative"); Mauro, supra note 11, at 12 
(describing the Court's progressive decisions as a departure from nine years of conser-
vative analysis); Charles Lane, Civil Liberties Were Term's Big Winner, WASH. POST, June 
29, 2003, at A1 (describing the Court's most recent term as "play[ing] against type"). 
13 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973), while replacing the trimester test with an undue burden standard); 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (extending Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), to 
declare unconstitutional a prayer at an optional middle-school graduation ceremony). 
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and Anthony Kennedy. Like prior swing Justices, O'Connor and 
Kennedy are sensitive to social and political forces. 14 For example, 
O'Connor, according to her brother Alan Day, "doesn't like to be part 
of polarizing decisions ... 'she takes it hard and feels it hard."' 15 
Kennedy is purported to pay careful attention to how his votes will 
impact his and the Court's reputation. 16 In other words, these justices 
seem to look to signals sent to the Court by elected officials, elites, and 
the American people in sorting out their opinions. 
This Essay is divided into two Parts. The first Part details how the 
Rehnquist Court has consistently heeded social and political forces in 
its decisionmaking. The second Part focuses on the Grulter decision. 
It describes the majoritarian forces that helped sway the Court and 
explains how the Court's decision reflects those social and political in-
fluences. 
I. THE PAST IS PROLOGUE 
Constitutional decision making is a dynamic process that involves 
all parts of the govemment and the people as well. 17 As Chief justice 
William Rehnquist noted, the "currents and tides of public opinion 
lap at the courthouse door," for judges "go home at night and read 
the newspaper or watch the evening news on television; they talk to 
14 William Mishler & Reginald Sheehan, Public opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and 
Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-AnaZvtic Pmpective, 58 J. POL. 169, 197 (1996) 
(finding that moderates on the Court, who tend to be swing votes, have the greatest 
response to changing public opinion). See also text accompanying notes infra 18, 93-
120 (detailing the social and political forces that contributed to the Court's delibera-
tions in the Grutter and Gratz decisions). 
11
' Evan Thomas & Stuart Taylor, Jr., She Helped America Seek a Middle Ground on the 
Thorny Subject of Race, NEWS\\'EEK,July 7, 2003, at 46, 49 (quoting Alan Day). 
16 Comments made by Justice Kennedy in an October 1992 interview provide sup-
port for this claim. In explaining why it is '"dangerous"' for a Supreme Court Justice 
to think "'himself a philosopher,"' Kennedy remarked: '"History has its own way of 
unfolding, tripping you up or vindicating you. You're required to look into a crystal 
ball, but you don't see much there."' Jerry Carter, Crossing the Rubicon, CAL. LAW, Oct. 
1992, at 39, 104 (quoting Kennedy). 
17 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg have all endorsed this dynamic pro-
cess. See The Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 
222-23 (1987) (statement of Anthony M. Kennedy) (testifYing about the obligation of 
Congress to pass legislation correcting erroneous rulings); SA.'\IDRA DAY O'CONNOR, 
THE MAJES1YOFTHE LAw 44 (2003) (explaining that if"one looks at the history of the 
Court, the country, and the Constitution over a very long period, the relationship ap-
pears to be more of a dialogue than a series of commands"); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Speaking in a judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1186 (1992) (stating that effective 
judges engage in a dialogue with other branches of government). 
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their family and friends about current events." 18 Supreme Courtjus-
tices also "reflect . . . the views and values of the lawyer class from 
which the Court's members are usually drawn." 19 "[O]verwhelmingly 
upper-middle or upper-class and extremely well educated, usually at 
the nation's most elite universities,"20 the views of economic and social 
leaders matter more to the Court than to popularly elected lawmakers 
(who must appeal to popular sentiment in order to win elections). In 
particular, since the justices' reputations are shaped by the media, law 
professors, and somewhat left-leaning lawyers' groups such as the 
American Bar Association, they maximize their status by taking elite 
• • • 21 
opmwn mto account. 
Lacking the powers of purse and sword, moreover, the Court can-
not resist "a determined and persistent lawmaking majority;" it can 
only put its preferences in place against "a weak m<Bority."22 In sorting 
out their personal views of how the Constitution should be inter-
preted, some Supreme Court Justices consider whether elected offi-
cials will comply with decisions.23 These Justices have weaker prefer-
18 William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REv. 751, 768 (1986). It is true that some Justices care passionately about an issue and, 
thus, are unlikely to be swayed by majoritarian forces. But other Justices (often the 
swing Justices who cast the decisive votes) have relatively weak preferences. It is likely 
that these Justices are more apt to take into account the potential political fallout of a 
decision. 
19 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia,J., dissenting). For a parallel 
commentary suggesting that the Court's ruling in Romer was fueled by cultural elites, 
see Lino A. Graglia, Romer v. Evans: The People Foiled Again by the Constitution, 68 U. 
COL. L. REv. 409,409-10 (1997). 
20 Klarman, supra note 4, at 189. 
21 See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Veering Left: The Art of judicial Evolution, NAT'LJ., July 5, 
2003, at 2154 (noting recent decisions are contrary to the media depiction of the 
Court); Frederick Schauer, Judicial Incentives and the Design of Legal Institutions 
(1998) (unpublished working paper) (concluding that it would be a mistake to assume 
that judges are less susceptible to reputation and public approval than other decision 
makers), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/schauer/judicial.htm. For an 
argument that "heavy criticism" of Bush v. Gore "led to a term of unpredictable deci-
sions" in which several Justices took "unexpectedly centrist positions," see Alan M. Der-
showitz, Curious Fallout from Bush v. Gore, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, atA15. 
22 Dahl, supra note 3, at 286. 
23 See Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revis-
ited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences (2000) 
(unpublished manuscript prepared for Midwest Political Science Association) (stating 
that because the Court has to rely on the other two branches of government to give 
judicial rulings full effect, Justices must consider the extent to which policymakers will 
support their decisions), available at http://www.unc.edu/-jstimson/papers.htm; Lee 
Epstein et. al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY LJ. 583, 
585 (2001) (arguing thatJustices cannot be effective without considering the goals and 
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ences about the substantive issues before the Court and, consequently, 
are more willing to take account of the views of elites, elected officials, 
and the American people.24 
The Supreme Court's practice of operating within parameters es-
tablished by majoritarian forces is also tied to the judicial appoint-
ment process. Nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate, Supreme Court Justices are products of the social and political 
forces at the time of their nomination. This process "favors persons 
with ambivalent, unknown or centrist views on the hotly contested is-
sues of the day;" those with known "militant views ... need not ap-
ply."25 Furthermore, even though Supreme Court Justices are insu-
lated from political pressures such as election, several Justices have 
held elected office or worked closely with elected officials.26 These 
Justices are accustomed to taking into account the views of interest 
groups, the American people, and other elected officials. 
For its part, the Rehnquist Court follows this historical pattern. 
Social and political forces explain both its hesitancy to embrace the 
social conservative agenda and its willingness, at least from 1995 to 
2002, to break significant doctrinal ground on federalism. 27 Consider, 
reactions from the Legislative and Executive branches); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies andRe-
sistance, 92 YALE LJ. 585, 588 (1983) (stating that in response to resistence of citizens 
and public officials to the Court's holding in Brown v. Board ofEducation,judges were 
forced to approve "imperfect remedies, remedies that [did] not fully vindicate rights). 
For a competing perspective, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD j. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 315-16 (2002), which contends that 
Justices only care about personal preferences when casting their votes. For additional 
treatment of this point, see text accompanying notes infra 90-91, 122-24. 
24 See Mishler & Sheehan supra note 14, at 197 (concluding that judicial attitudes 
"are dynamic and susceptible to change in response to public opinion as social change"). 
25 Mark A. Graber, Dred Scott Book 2-3 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author) 
26 Consider, for example, the Rehnquist Court's swing Justices, Sandra Day 
O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy. O'Connor was a state legislator and Kennedy's fa-
ther was a state lobbyist. See Biographies of Current Members of the Supreme Court 
(last visited November 23, 2003) (noting that Justice O'Conner was "appointed to the 
Arizona State Senate in 1969 and was subsequently reelected to two two-year terms") , at 
http:/ /www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf; Robert Reinhold, 
Restrained Pragmatist Anthony M. Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1987, at AI (describing 
Justice Kennedy's father as "a politically connected lawyer and lobbyist in Sacra-
mento"). 
27 I have made this point in other writings. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congress as Cul-
f:rrit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE LJ. 435, 462-
63 (2001) (calling attention to the Court's aggressive efforts to strike down federal 
statutes, while remaining "somewhat middle-<>f-the-road on divisive social policy"); 
Neal Devins, Congress and the Making of the Second Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 
773, 774-76 (2003) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court, in general, and Justices 
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for example, the Court's federalism revival. Why did the Court limit 
Congress' power based on federalism principles, and why did it wait 
until 1995 to begin its revival? What prompted the Court to extend its 
somewhat ambiguous initial rulings into bolder statements about the 
limits of Congress' power? Why has the Court excluded race and 
gender from its Fourteenth Amendment, Section Five revolution? In 
answering these questions, it is useful to look to the majoritarian in-
fluences that shape the Justices' understanding of Congress and their 
power to limit Congress. Majoritarian forces that have given the 
Court both reason and incentive to limit Congress include the (then) 
ever-growing populist distrust of big government, the increasing will-
ingness of candidates to embrace anti-Congress rhetoric, the Contract 
with America-spurred 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, the un-
willingness of members of Congress to take issue with or even discuss 
Supreme Court decisions limiting federal powers, and the failure of 
interest groups to feel sufficiently threatened by the Court's anti-
Congress decisions to mobilize in opposition to them.28 
Social and political forces, especially Congress' support of civil 
and abortion rights, have also figured prominently in Rehnquist Court 
rulings on social issues. Unlike its federalism revival (where a coali-
tion of five Justices joined forces to limit Congress' power), Justices 
Kennedy and O'Connor have refused to sign onto the conservative so-
cial agenda. Their refusal is almost certainly tied to majoritarian sig-
nals sent to the Court. From 1981-1992, for example, the Reagan and 
Bush administrations sought to reshape constitutional law through ju-
dicial appointments and Justice Department arguments.2!' These ef-
forts, however, were strongly resisted by Congress, interest groups, and 
O'Connor and Kennedy, in particular, consider social and political forces when mak-
ing decisions). 
28 I do not mean to suggest that lawmakers and the American people are pushing 
the Court to invalidate federal statutes. My point, instead, is that the Court's rulings 
are consistent with social and political forces. In addition to my writings on the sub-
ject, see Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. LJ. 123, 
125 (2003) for the argument that the current Congress is generally sympathetic to 
Court decisions constraining lawmaker powers; Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the 
Recent Tum in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE LJ. 307, 334-51 (2001) for the asser-
tion that anti-Congress public opinion helps explain federalism decisions; Keith E. 
Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 
DUKE LJ. 477 (2001) for the proposition that the Court has taken advantage of law-
maker and interest group disinterest in Court decision making. 
29 See infra text accompanying notes 38-42, 56-58 (describing Justice Department 
arguments against affirmative action). 
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elites (especially academics and joumalists).3° For Justices Kennedy 
and O'Connor, battles between the White House, Congress, and other 
interests called attention to the costs of embracing the social conserva-
tive agenda. Starting in 1994, O'Connor and Kennedy often opposed 
granting certiorari in these cases,31 pushing the Court away from con-
tentious social issues and towards less controversial federalism cases.32 
More telling, some of their opinions refer to social and political forces 
in explaining why the Court cannot embrace conservative objectives.33 
The best known example of this is Planned Parenthood v. Casey.34 By 
reaffirming Roe, the Casey plurality (O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter) vali-
dated Senate Judiciary Committee efforts to preserve a constitutional 
right to abortion. By turning down Robert Bork's nomination and by 
making Roe the focus of subsequent confirmation hearings, the Senate 
made "clear to [Supreme Court] nominees that a willingness to pro-
fess belief in some threshold constitutional values is a prerequisite for 
the job."35 Even more telling, by rejecting Bork, the Senate paved the 
way for the appointment of Justices Kennedy and Souter, both of 
whom lack strong ties to conservative interests and have often resisted 
the conservative social agenda.36 Finally, to the extent that the Senate 
30 See, e.g., David Johnston, Facing His Term's End, Barr Defends His Record, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1992, at A13 (describing Congressional criticism of the Justice De-
partment in terms of "an agency that drove the Republicans' conservative legal agenda 
for a dozen years"); Editorial, A 'Blueprint' All Right-For Segregation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 
1984, at A26 (criticizing the Reagan administration's plan for ending mandatory bus-
ing as a blueprint for school segregation); see also Schwartz, infra note 46, at 525 n.ll 
(noting positive press reactions for Supreme Court support for affirmative action). 
31 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 569, 637 (2003) (describing O'Connor's and Kennedy's 
reluctance to hear cases concerning social issues due to their "reputational costs" for 
the Court). 
32 See id. at 581 (charting dramatic differences in balance between social issue and 
federalism cases before and after 1995). Before its 2002-2003 term, moreover, the 
Court broke relatively little doctrinal ground on social issue cases. See id. at 581-84 
(discussing the Court's decisions to maintain previous doctrine on abortion, school 
prayer, and, to some extent, affirmative action). This is not to say that the second 
Rehnquist Court has steered clear of all cases raising contentious social issues. While it 
has been relatively less active than the first Rehnquist Court, the second Rehnquist 
Court has issued several significant rulings on cases implicating the conservative social 
agenda. 
33 See infra notes 65-71 (providing examples of these opinions); see also Lawrence 
v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (linking the Court's rejection of same-sex sodomy stat-
ute with changing social attitudes towards gay rights). 
34 505 u.s. 833 ( 1992) 0 
35 Stephen J. Wermiel, Confirming the Constitution: The Role of the Senate judiciary 
Committee, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 121-22 (1993). 
36 Kennedy, of course, filled the seat that Bork would have occupied. Souter (who 
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is a barometer of interest group and populist sentiment, Bork and 
subsequent confirmation battles made clear that the vigorous pursuit 
of social conservative causes would spill over to elections and other-
wise fuel the ongoing culture wars. In this way, lawmakers signaled to 
the Court that the pursuit of social conservative objectives would come 
at a price, such as legislation overturning Court rulings and the rejec-
tion of conservative nominees. The Casey plurality took these social 
and political forces into account. Emphasizing the costs of "over-
rul [in g) under [political] fire" and linking the Court's "legitimacy" to 
the "people's confidence in the Judiciary,"37 the Casey plurality tied 
their refusal to do the bidding of the President who appointed them 
to the Court's "legitimacy." 
On civil rights, Rehnquist Court decision making also reflects ma-
joritarian forces. Consider the following: the Reagan administration 
succeeded in only 43% of the Supreme Court cases it participated in 
(as compared to the Solicitor General office's average success rate of 
70%). In sharp contrast, the Court agreed with Clinton administra-
tion filings 74% of the time.38 In other words, the conservative argu-
ments of the Reagan administration were far less successful with the 
Rehnquist Court than the more liberal arguments of the Clinton ad-
ministration. Social and political forces figure prominently in under-
standing the relative success rates of the Reagan and Clinton admini-
strations. In particular, inept policymaking and a lack of political 
resolve plagued Reagan administration efforts to narrow civil rights 
protections and eviscerate affirmative action. 
Witness the Reagan Justice Department's failed campaign against 
affirmative action. By condemning those who "worship at the altar of 
forced busing and mandatory quotas"39 and calling racial preferences 
had no paper trail) was appointed, in part, to avoid the kind of confirmation battle 
that was fought over the Bork nomination . It is also noteworthy that Ronald Reagan's 
detem1ination to appoint the first woman to the Supreme Court resulted in the nomi-
nation of Sandra Day O 'Connor. In other words, unlike Bork, Scalia, Thomas, and 
Rehnquist (who was elevated by Reagan), the social conservative agenda gave way to 
other values when Kennedy, Souter, and O 'Connor were appointed to the Court. 
37 Casey, 505 U.S. at 867. For Mike Paulsen, the Casey plurality's focus on politics, 
not law, makes it "the worst constitutional decision of the United Supreme Court of all 
time." Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 995, 1001-02 (2003). 
38 See Merrill, supra note 31, at 622-28 (comparing the success rate of Reagan ad-
ministration in twenty-two 1986-1988 decisions to Clinton administration in twenty-
three 1997-1999 decisions). 
39 Steven R. Weisman, Reagan Strongly Defends Policies on Minority and Women's 
Rights, N .Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1983, at Al. 
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"(just as] offensive to standards of human decency today as [they 
were] some 84 years ago when countenanced under Plessy v. Ferguson,"40 
Reagan and his Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, Brad Rey-
nolds, launched a morally and rhetorically divisive campaign against 
preferences. But this absolutist campaign against preferences met stiff 
resistance from Congress, interest groups, state and local officials, big 
business, the media, and, ultimately, the courts. 
For example, when the Justice Department asked states and locali-
ties to join it in challenging longstanding affirmative action consent 
decrees, mayors and governors almost always criticized the Depart-
ment (and lower court judges uniformly turned down the Depart-
ment's efforts).41 More significantly, in 1989, the Reagan administra-
tion galvanized Congress and civil rights groups by trying to restore 
tax breaks to racially discriminatory private schools and by opposing 
bipartisan efforts to make disparate racial impact an important evi-
dentiary tool in voting rights cases.42 The power of civil rights groups 
was on full display during the battle over Robert Bork's nomination to 
the Supreme Court. Senate Judiciary Committee chair Joseph Biden 
"plotted strategy" with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Leadership 
Conference on Civil Rights, and other civil rights groups. 43 
Congress also took aim at Reagan administration affirmative ac-
tion initiatives. By enacting legislation,44 holding oversight hearings, 
and turning down nominees who opposed affirmative action (includ-
ing the nomination of Brad Reynolds to be Associate Attorney Gen-
eral),45 Congress communicated its continuing support of existing 
40 Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment opportunity and Affirmative Action: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on t.mployment opportunities of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1981) (statement of William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attor-
ney General for Civil Rights). 
41 See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER Ai'ID LAw 109-10 (1991) (recounting one of Rey-
nolds' failed attempts to force modifications of local consent decrees relating to sen-
iority systems); Stephen Engelberg, Attack on Quotas opposed by Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 
1985, at Al ("In New York, New Jersey, Miami, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia and San 
Francisco, officials said in interviews that they opposed the Administration's effort to 
eliminate quotas for hiring blacks, Hispanic-Americans and women."). 42 See Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1755-56 (1991) 
(arguing that these "policy blunders" contributed to the lack of a centralized effort by 
the Reagan administration on civil rights). 
43 TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE 246-4 7 ( 1992). 44 See, e.g., Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202 (1987) (highlighting 
Con~ress' legislative opposition to Reagan's stance on affirmative action). 
"See Howard Kurtz, Reynolds' Nomination Voted Down, WASH. POST,June 28, 1985, 
at AI (describing Congress' "stunning rejection of [Reynolds,] the chief architect of 
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affirmative action programs. For their part, the press and big business 
strongly backed affirmative action. Twenty of twenty-one "top papers" 
rejected Reagan Justice Department efforts to dismantle affirmative 
action.46 Big business has also been a consistent supporter of affirma-
tive action. For reasons ranging from avoiding costly lawsuits to im-
proving a company's public image to increasing productivity, 
"[b] usinessmen like to hire by the numbers. "47 
By 1986, the year Rehnquist became Chief Justice, the Reagan Jus-
tice Department's campaign against affirmative action lay in shambles. 
Unable to tap into populist disapproval of racial quotas, Justice De-
partment attacks on racial preferences were portrayed as insensitive 
and mean spirited.48 Rebukes by Congress, interest groups, and the 
press reinforced the desire of most department and agency heads to 
leave in place existing affirmative action programs.49 Even the White 
House distanced itself from the Justice Department's campaign against 
affirmative action. Refusing to undo an executive order requiring 
325,000 government contractors to adopt affirmative action plans, the 
President preferred speaking about his administration "strongly sup-
port[ing]" programs that "provide special assistance to minority busi-
nesses."50 Consistent with these social and political forces, the Supreme 
the Reagan administration's civil rights policies"). 
46 See Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affinnative Action Cases: It's All Over But 
the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REv. 524, 525 n.11 (1987) (surveying the positive reactions of 
newspapers to the Supreme Court's rejection of Justice Department arguments in 
Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), the 1986 affirmative action decision 
barring layoffs of senior non-minority employees). 
47 Anne B. Fisher, Businessmen Like to Hire by the Numbers, FORTUNE, Sept. 16, 1985, 
at 26 ("[P]ersuasive evidence indicates that most large American corporations want to 
retain their affirmative action programs, numerical goals and all."). See also PETER H. 
SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 172-73 
(2003) (describing corporate support for affirmative action to avoid adverse publicity). 
48 See supra note 30, 41-43 and accompanying text (describing the resistance to the 
attmepts by the Reagan and first Bush adminstrations to advance a conservative social 
agenda). 
49 See Devins supra note 42, at 1752-58 (providing specific examples of the efforts 
by civil rights groups to limit the Justice Department's attempts to diminish affirmative 
action). 
50 President's Remarks to Members of the National Association of Minority Con-
tractors, 20 WEEKLYCOMP. PRES. Doc. 946,949 (June 27, 1984). The Reagan admini-
stration's campaign against affirmative action, ultimately, was quite modest-limited to 
the Justice Department and a handful of agencies. See Devins, supra note 42, at 1752-
58 (describing Reagan's uncoordinated and ultimately moderate civil rights policy). 
Consequently, social conservatives accused the administration of being two-faced, of 
"wring[ing] what[ever] partisan advantage it [could] from the pattern of racial and 
ethnic spoils established in the 1970s." Jeremy Rabkin, Reagan's Secret Quotas, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1985, at 15, 17. 
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Court rejected the Department's claim that all preferences were im-
moral and illegal. Initially, the Burger Court approved a range of hir-
ing and promotion schemes that benefited racial minorities and 
5I 
women. 
The Rehnquist Court, undoubtedly aware of the political mael-
strom surrounding affirmative action, largely followed its predeces-
sor's lead. Its initial constitutional rulings were a mixed bag. In 1987, 
it ruled, in United States v. Paradise, that a requirement of one Mrican 
American for one white promotion is a constitutionally permissible 
remedy.52 In 1989, it concluded in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. 
that state affirmative action plans are subject to strict scrutiny review.53 
The very next year, however, it ruled that federal affirmative action 
plans are subject to mid-tier review. 
This ruling, lvfetro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 54 is especially instructive 
in understanding the linkage between majoritarian forces and the 
Court's affirmative action jurisprudence. By filing an amicus brief in 
the litigation and, more importantly, enacting legislation blocking 
Reagan FCC reconsideration of diversity preferences, Congress em-
braced these affirmative-action programs.55 The first Bush administra-
tion also signaled its support of these preferences, albeit in a less clear 
way. Following the lead of the Reagan administration, the Bush Jus-
tice Department formally opposed affirmative action.56 However, the 
51 Even when ruling against affirmative action (as it did in Wygant, 476 U.S. 267), 
the Court rejected Justice Department efforts to limit affirmative action to the actual 
victims of discrimination and, in so doing, handed a "significant victory [to] civil rights 
groups." Al Kamen, High Court Ruling Signals Suppart for Affirmative Action: Groups See 
Victory in Teachers' Case, WASH. POST, May 20, 1986, at AI (discussing the Wygant opin-
ions which "showed a strong majority [of the court] in favor of affirmative action, in 
general, and in agreement on 'central core principles."'). For an overview of Reagan-
era Supreme Court decision making, see Neal Devins, Affirmative Action After Reagan, 68 
TEX. L. REV. 353, 360-78 (1989); Schwartz, supra note 46, at 527-37. 
52 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (holding that the "one-for-one promotion require-
ment was narrowly tailored to serve its several purposes."). Also in 1987, the Court re-
fused to consider constitutional issues when approving-{)n statutory grounds-an af-
firmative action plan that granted preferences to women seeking promotions . .Johnson 
v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620 n.2 (1987). 
53 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that the purpose of strict scrutiny is to insure 
that racial classifications are only used to pursue important governmental interests). For 
a discussion of statutory decisions issued in 1989, see supra text accompanying note 42. 
54 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding that FCC affirmative action policies were substan-
tially related to achieving broadcast diversity). 
55 See Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAW & 
COl\'TEMP. PROBS. 145, 176-78 (1993) (discussing Congress' actions to limit FCC reex-
amination of diversity preferences and arguments in favor of such preferences in Metro). 
56 See id. at 177-78 (describing the Justice Department's characterization of racial 
HeinOnline -- 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 359 2003-2004
2003] EXPLAINING GRU1TA'R V. BOLLINGER 359 
President also facilitated the vigorous defense of racial preferences in 
Metro by appointing three FCC Commissioners who strongly favored 
diversity preferences and promised to defend those preferences in 
court.57 Also, rather than have the Solicitor General (who is statutorily 
authorized to control FCC Supreme Court litigation) block the FCC 
from defending diversity preferences, the administration authorized 
the FCC to represent itself before the Supreme Court.''8 Finally, Bush 
distanced himselffrom Reagan justice Department policies. Two weeks 
after his inauguration, he expressed disappointment with the Court's 
just-issued Croson decision, speaking of his "commit[ment] to affirma-
tive action" and his support for a narrow reading of the decision.59 
Elected govemment officials signaled their support for minority 
interests in other important ways during the Bush years. By commis-
sioning "disparity studies" that supported claims of continuing dis-
crimination in public contracting, states and municipalities were able 
to minimize Croson's impact.60 Even more significantly, the bitter bat-
tle over Clarence Thomas's Supreme Court nomination underscored 
opposition to the social conservative agenda by powerful civil rights 
interests and their supporters in Congress. Additionally, after officials 
in the Department of Education questioned the constitutionality of 
government-funded minority scholarships, the President made clear 
that he disagreed with this interpretation, stating that the question 
was one "for the courts to rule on."61 Finally, Bush signed on to law-
maker efforts to invalidate the Rehnquist Court's earlier restrictive 
preferences in Metro as "precisely the type of racial stereotyping that is anathema to 
basic constitutional principles"). 
57 ld. at 177. 
58 See id. at 178 (noting that the Solicitor General "allowed the FCC to serve as the 
government's principle voice in the case."). The Bush justice Department did file an 
amicus brief opposing racial preferences. For additional discussion about the Bush 
administration's possible reasons for adopting these conflicting courses of action, see 
id. at 177-78. 
59 The President's News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS 21, 29 Uan. 27, 1989). 
60 See Dorothy J. Gaiter, Court Ruling Makes Discrimination Studies a Hot New Industry, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1993, at Al (describing the city of Miami's reaction to disparity 
studies conducted as a result of the Croson decision); George R. La Noue, Social Science 
and Minority "Set-Asides", IlO PUB. INT., Winter 1993, at 49, 61 ("Above all, it is the dis-
parity studies themselves that are proving to be the greatest impediment to implement-
ing Croson. No matter how poorly done, a several-hundred-page disparity study 'prov-
ing discrimination' will quiet critics in the political and business community just by its 
existence."). 
61 Karen De Witt, U.S. Eases College Aid Stand, But Not All the Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
19,1990, atAl. 
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readings of civil rights statutes.62 By overruling six of these Rehnquist 
Court decisions, the resulting statute, the 1991 Civil Rights Act, "was 
designed to be, and was, a massive rebuke to the Court."fi3 
Against this backdrop, unsurprisingly, the Rehnquist Court shifted 
its energies away from affirmative action and other social issues and 
toward federalism. By denying certiorari to most cases involving divi-
sive social issues, more liberal Justices who feared conservative out-
comes teamed with swing Justices (like O'Connor and Kennedy) who 
are not strongly committed to the conservative social agenda.64 From 
its Metro Broadcasting decision in 1990 until Grutter was decided in the 
spring of 2003, the Court issued only one substantive ruling on the con-
stitutionality of affirmative action: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia.fi5 
Recognizing that the pursuit of socially conservative objectives 
would come at a high price,66 the Court broke little doctrinal ground. 
During the Reagan and Bush years, the Court's decision making on 
62 See Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
955, 990-99 (1993) (calling attention to reports that Bush '"strongly expressed' ... his 
desire to sign the bill"). When the bill was first passed by Congress, Bush depicted the 
legislation as a "quota bill" and vetoed it. But a compromise was reached, in large part, 
because Bush pressured his negotiators to meet with civil rights leaders and find a way 
for him to sign the bill. ld. 
63 Merrill, supra note 31, at 631. 
64 ld. at 637 (speculating that O 'Connor and Kennedy may be more concerned 
about reputational costs than furthering the conservative social agenda). 
65 515 U .S. 200 (1995) (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to government contracts). 
In 1993 and 2000, the Court issued decisions on the justiciability of affirmative-action 
lawsuits. In 1993, the Court ruled that a construction contractor's association had 
standing to challenge a city ordinance setting aside ten percent of city contracts for 
minority businesses. This decision, Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associate General Con-
tractors of America v. Jacksonville, reaffirmed the Court's jurisdictional ruling in Bakke. 
508 U.S. 656, 665-68 (1993) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-81 n.14 (1978)) . Then in 
2000, the Court concluded that Colorado could not moot a follow-up to Adarand by 
modifying its affirmative action program. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 
216 (2000) . 
The Rehnquist Court had also agreed to hear another follow-up to Adarand; at the 
urging of the second Bush administration, however, it dismissed the case as "improvi-
dently granted." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) . The 
Court also agreed to decide whether employment discrimination statutes allow a 
school board to consider race when terminating a teacher. This case, Piscataway Town-
ship Board of .Caucation v. Taxman, was dismissed after a coalition of civil rights interest 
groups joined together to settle the case with the teacher who filed the lawsuit. 522 
U.S. 1010 (1997), cert. dismissed. 
66 See supra text accompanying notes 41-51 (describing the contentious struggle 
between the Reagan and first Bush administration , and those civil rights ' groups and 
like minded public officials over attempts to limit the scope of affirmative action)) . 
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affirmative action was indeterminate and often unintelligible.67 The 
Court's sole Clinton-era decision, Adarand,68 followed this pattern. On 
the one hand, the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting by concluding 
that federal affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny 
review.69 At the same time, Adarand referred to the "unhappy persis-
tence" of race discrimination and the power of the government to act 
"in response to it."70 By ruling in this way, the Court sought to "dispel 
the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' 71 
Moreover, by refusing to rule on the constitutionality of the federal 
affirmative action plan in Adarand, the Court was quickly (and cor-
rectly) dismissed as "very nearly beside the point" and "insignifican[t]" 
because it "settled nothing."72 Furthermore, the Court's refusal to 
hear numerous post-Adarand challenges to affirmative action in public 
education gave state and federal officials free reign to sort out the 
constitutionality of affirmative action.73 
67 See supra text accompanying notes 52-54 (describing the Court's incongruous 
rulinJs during the Reagan and first Bush administrations). 
515 U.S. at 200. 
69 fd. at 227. 
70 fd. at 262 n.l6. 
71 Id. at 237. 
72 
Linda Greenhouse, In Step on Racial Policy, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1995, at AI (sug-
gesting that the Court's decision was "very nearly beside the point" because the fate of 
affirmative action will ultimately be decided in the political arena); Charles 
Krauthammer, Affirmative Action: Settle it Out of Court, WASH. POST, June 16, 1995, at 
A25 (asserting the "relative insignificance" of the Court's decision); George F. Will, 
Affirmative Action: The Court's Murky Ruling, WASH. POST, June 14, 1995, at A25 (con-
tending that the Adarand decision "settled nothing"). 
73 See Lyle Denniston & Patrick Healy, Supreme Court to Weigh Race in Admissions, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 3, 2002, at AI (describing the conflicting opinions of lower courts 
regarding the constitutionality of affirmative action). On voting rights, however, the 
Rehnquist Court issued several significant rulings during this period. From 1993 to 
2003, the Court issued eight decisions concerning the constitutionality of race-
conscious redistricting. For the most part, these decisions follow claims made in this 
essay about the pivotal role that social and political forces play in explaining Rehnquist 
Court decision making. To start, the Court's initial foray into voting rights occurred 
during the first Rehnquist Court (1986-1994). See supra text accompanying notes 31-
32 (discussing the differences between the first and second Rehnquist Courts, espe-
cially the first Rehnquist Court's willingness to resolve contentious social issues). That 
decision, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), cast doubt on the constitutionality of vot-
ing rights legislation that encouraged states to create voting districts in which a major-
ity of voters were racial minorities. The scope of Shaw was expanded in Miller v.John-
son, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1998), which held that race could not "subordinated 
traditional race-neutral districting principles ... to racial considerations." Subse-
quently, however, the Court has largely bowed to those social and political forces that 
helped propel bipartisan support for race-conscious redistricting legislation. In par-
ticular, recognizing that racial minorities often vote for democratic candidates, the 
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Eight years after Adarand, the Supreme Court reentered the fray 
with Grutter. As the next Part of this essay will detail, Grutter, like prior 
Rehnquist Court decisions on affirmative action, conformed to social 
and political forces. These forces have always supported affirmative 
action. Consequently, just as the Rehnquist Court responded to ma-
joritarian pressures by rejecting the social conservative agenda in the 
years before its federalism revolution, the Court in Grutter once again 
issued a decision that echoed the pressures beating against it. 
II. EXPLAINING GRU7Tt,'R V. BOLLINGER 
By linking Rehnquist Court affirmative-action decisions to the so-
cial and political forces influencing the Court, the prior Part under-
scores the pivotal role that m~oritarian influences play in Supreme 
Court decision making. This Part will focus on the Court's recent ap-
proval of affirmative action in Grutter. Initially, it will track the ongo-
ing support for affirmative action by elected officials and other inter-
est groups, starting with elected government's response to Adarand 
and culminating in the Grutter litigation. Following this examination 
of majoritarian influences, it will discuss the ways in which social and 
political forces seem to have impacted on the outcome and reasoning 
of both Grutter and Gratz. 
* * * 
In the years following Adarand, federal and state officials con-
demned race quotas but continued to support affirmative action. Al-
though Clinton repudiated both proportionate representation of mi-
norities in Congress and overly rigid preference plans/4 he argued 
that Adarand "actually reaffirmed the need for affirmative action."75 
Through a White House-conducted affirmative-action review, the 
Court has concluded that lawmakers-when drawing district lines-can pay attention 
to race in order to advance political objectives. Easley v. Cromartie, 592 U.S. 1076 
(2001). 
74 Clinton withdrew his nomination of Lani Gunier to head the Justice Depart-
ment's Civil Rights Division for precisely this reason (although Democratic lawmakers' 
complaints about Gunier's writings certainly figured into his calculus). Neil A. Le\vis, 
Clinton Abandons His Nominee for Rights Post Amid opposition, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1993, at 
A1 (noting that Clinton "could not defend many of her views on bolstering the politi-
cal power of blacks"). 
75 Remarks on Affirmative Action at the National Archives and Records Admini-
stration, II PUB. PAPERS,July 19, 1995, 1112. 
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Clinton administration concluded that nearly all affirmative-action 
programs are responsive to discrimination, do not unduly burden 
non-minorities, and accomplish their objectives of increasing oppor-
tunities for minorities and women.75 The Clinton administration, 
moreover, resisted a Fifth Circuit ruling prohibiting affirmative action 
in higher education. The Justice Department asked the Supreme 
Court to reverse the decision and the Department of Education con-
sidered rescinding federal funds given to schools that eliminated af-
firmative action programs. 77 
For its part, the pre-Grutter George W. Bush administration had 
signaled its qualified support of affirmative action. Even though Bush 
ran on an anti-preference platform, he campaigned in Mrican Ameri-
can communities, stated that racial progress was "still too slow," and 
"went to the NAACP convention and apologized for [the Republican 
party's] mistakes on civil rights."78 Once in office, he assembled a 
cabinet "every bit as diverse as former President Clinton's."79 Bush 
also reached out to minority voters by pursuing policy initiatives on 
voter fraud and racial profiling, as well as reappointing two Mrican 
American judges (initially picked by Clinton) whose nominations the 
Republican Senate had stalled.80 In August 2001, the administration 
76 See Ann Devroy, Clinton Study Backs Affirmative Action: Five-Month Reviw Supports 
Some Reforms, WASH. POST, July 19, 1995, at A1 (summarizing the administration's con-
clusion that the "vast majority" of affirmative action programs were beneficial and 
should continue). Immediately after Adarand, government agencies were told that, 
"[n]o affirmative action program should be suspended prior to" an evaluation of the 
program's constitutionality. Legal Guidance on the Implications of the Supreme Court's Deci-
sion inAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel171, 202 (1995); 
see also Alan J. Meese, Bakke Betrayed, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 479, 482 (2000) 
(suggesting that the Clinton administration advanced its affirmative action agenda by, 
among other things, misreading Bakke). 
77 See Peter Applebome, Texas is Told to Keep Affirmative Action in Universities or Risk 
Losing Federal Aid, N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 1997, at B11 (discussing the Departmenl of 
Education's warning to Texas to keep affirmative-action provisions in place or risk los-
ing federal funding); Ann Devroy, Affirmative Action Rules are Revised, WASH. POST, May 
23, 1996, at Al (reporting that the Justice Department was preparing to file a brief 
supporting efforts to overturn the Texas ruling barring affirmative action in higher 
education). But see Peter Applebome, In Shift, US. Tells Texas It Can't Ignore Ruling Bar-
ring Bias in College Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1997, at A20 (describing the De-
partment of Education's reversal and subsequent mandate that Texas ban the use of 
racial preferences in admissions and scholarships). 
78 JEREMY D. MAYER, RUNNING ON RACE 281, 284 (2002). 
79 Jim VandeHei, Extending Diversity to Bush Subcabinet will be Tough Task, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 6, 2001, atA20. 
80 See Editorial, Bush and the Black Agenda, CHRISTIAl'-1 SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 7, 2001, 
at 8 (describing Bush's steps to confront Mrican American disillusionment with presi-
dential policy). 
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agreed to defend the constitutionality of a federal affirmative-action 
program before the Supreme Court.81 
Congress has also backed affirmative action. For example, follow-
ing the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, several key Republican 
leaders tried to move affirmative action off the legislative schedule. 
Correspondingly, motivated both by a desire "to craft a positive mes-
sage for minorities" and a corresponding fear that a fight over affirma-
tive action would delay their pursuit of the Contract with America re-
forms,82 Republicans in the House and Senate voted down proposals 
to roll back federal affirmative-action programs.83 A bill targeting ra-
cial preferences in higher education, for example, was soundly de-
feated because "'a majority of the Republican Conference realize[d] 
that the GOP would lose popular electoral support when it sup-
port[ed] anti-affirmative action measures."84 Indeed, with new census 
data suggesting that Republicans need to attract the growing number 
of working women and Hispanic voters, Republican lawmakers are 
more likely today than ever before to support affirmative action.85 
State support for affirmative action, with few exceptions, has also 
been steadfast. Although voters in California and Washington, in 
1996 and 1998, respectively, amended their state constitutions to ban 
racial preferences,86 the populist revolts against affirmative action 
81 Edward Walsh, Bush Backs Minority Program: High Court Brief Defends DOT Con-
tracting Plan, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 200I, at AI (reporting on the Bush administration 
brief defending the constitutionality of an affirmative action program). 
82 Senator John McCain, for example, argued that the costs of repudiating af-
firmative action were too great for his party, when he stated that "the danger exists that 
our [party's] aspirations and intentions will be misperceived, dividing our country and 
harming our party." 144 CONG. REc. SI490 (I998). 
83 See James Dao, Senate Stops Bid to End Road-Work Set-Asides, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 7, 
I998, at A9 (detailing the Senate rejection of an effort to end a federal program that 
set aside ten percent of highway contracts for minorities); Kevin Merida, Senate Rejects 
Gramm Bid to Bar Affirmative Action Set Asides, WASH. POST, July 2I, 1995, at AI3 (noting 
that the Gramm vote was defeated by a 6I to 36 vote). Cf Gerald F. Seib, GOP Congress 
Debates an Attack on Affirmative Action, WALL ST.]., Dec. 10, I996, at A24 (summarizing 
Republican hesitancy about supporting Proposition 209, an anti-affirmative action ini-
tiative). 
84 Juliet Eilperin, House Defeats Bill Targeting College Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, 
May 7, I 998, at A4 (quoting Rep. Henry Bonilla). 
85 See Thomas B. Edsall, Census a Clarion Call for Democrats, GOP. As Nation Changes, 
Parties are Warned They Need New Tactics to Woo Voters, WASH. POST, July 8, 200I, at A5 
(discussing Republican recognition that "the electorate is moving steadily to the left" 
and they need "to adopt new rhetoric and tactics to attract minority voters" to maintain 
leadership). 
86 See Alex Fryer, Affirmative Action fight Shifts from Ballot Box to Courtroom, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002, at AI (discussing the movements in Washington and California 
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largely had fizzled by the end of the 1990s. Further, state officials, in-
cluding Republican governors, typically opposed these initiatives.87 
Mter a 1996 backlash against the California anti-affirmative action ini-
tiative resulted in a Republican party loss of majority control of the 
state Assembly,88 Republican lawmakers vigorously and successfully 
opposed similar ballot initiatives.89 Anti-preference interests re-
sponded to this rebuke by turning their attention to the courts (at 
least before Grutter). 
By the time the Supreme Court agreed to hear Grutter and Gratz, 
state and federal support for affirmative action was stronger than ever. 
For this reason, there was little prospect of the Court embracing the 
same anti-affirmative action arguments that it rejected during the 
Reagan and first Bush administrations. Instead, given the Court's 
propensity to act within the constraints of majoritarian influences, the 
question was not whether the Court would disavow affirmative action, 
but whether it would meaningfully limit the power of colleges and 
universities to make race-based admissions decisions. For example, 
the Court could have demanded that schools first pursue race-neutral 
schemes before resorting to race-conscious ones. Similarly, the Court 
could have found that a school's pursuit of a "critical mass" of disad-
vantaged minorities was tantamount to a quota.90 "Vith elected offi-
to "prohibit public agencies from considering race and gender in hiring, public-works 
construction, and school admissions). 
87 See Davis S. Broder & Robert A. Barnes, Few Governors join Attack on Racial Politics, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1995, at A1 (describing how the backlash against affirmative ac-
tion has gained support from few governors). 
88 Fryer, supra note 86, at A1 (noting the anti-affirmative action campaign alien-
ated minority voters). Ironically, former California Governor Pete Wilson made his 
opposition to affirmative action a centerpiece of his 1996 bid for the Republican presi-
dential nomination. Paul Taylor, Wilson }"'ormally joins Presidential Race, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 29, 1995, at AS (describing Wilson's plan to make affirmative action a central is-
sue in his campaign). 
89 Fryer, supra note 86, at AI ("Republicans across the nation are largely following 
the lead of President Bush, who has largely avoided the affirmative-action issue."). In 
Florida, lawyers for Governor Jeb Bush, claiming that a proposed affirmative action 
initiative violated state law, went to court to block it. Jackie Hallifax, Connerly Petitions 
Argued, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 7, 2000, at SB. By opposing affirmative action in higher 
education, however, Jeb Bush energized minority voters-so much so that a dramatic 
increase in minority voter turnout in the 2000 presidential election nearly cost his 
brother the \\'hite House. See MAYER, supra note 78, at 289 (concluding that "[w]ithout 
that surge in black support for Gore, Bush would have won Florida [and thus, the 
\\'bite House] without the help of the Supreme Court"). 
90 This was the conclusion reached by the federal district court judge hearing the 
Michigan law school case. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 851 (2001) 
("[B]y using race to ensure the enrollment of a certain minimum percentage of un-
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cials opposing quotas and opinion polls showing popular opposition 
to racial preferences in college admissions (despite a poll showing 
that eighty percent of Americans also think it important for colleges 
to have "a racially diverse student body"),91 proponents of affirmative 
action had reason to fear the Court would approve affirmative action 
but narrow the ways in which schools could consider race. 
During the course of the Grutter litigation, proponents' fears gave 
way to a growing recognition that social and political pressures 
strongly favored Supreme Court approval of preferential admissions 
policies. In addition to overwhelming support by government and in-
terest group amici, developments outside the Court highlighted the 
costs of a Court decision invalidating or severely limiting prefer-
ences.92 In other words, notwithstanding the fact that most Americans 
oppose race-conscious admissions, majoritarian forces weighed heavily 
in favor of the Rehnquist Court's approval of affirmative action. 
* * * 
Social and political forces beating against the Court in the Grutter 
and Gratz cases include the amicus filings by both interest groups and 
lawmakers, the Bush administration's decision to embrace racial di-
versity as an important and legitimate governmental end, the continu-
ing salience of race discrimination in judicial confirmation politics, 
the ouster of Senate majority leader Trent Lott for making racially in-
sensitive comments, and the awareness of the difficulties of imple-
menting a Court ruling barring or severely limiting race-conscious 
admissions. In the pages that follow, this Essay will examine each of 
these factors. 
A. Amicus filings 
One hundred two amicus briefs were filed in Grutter and Gratz-
eighty-three supporting the University of Michigan and nineteen sup-
porting the petitioners. The gap between supporters and opponents 
derrepresented minority students ... the current admissions policy [is] practically in-
distinguishable from a quota system."). 91 Charles Lane, Polls: Americans Say Court is 'About Right,' WASH. POST, July 7, 
2003, at Al5. Likewise, most Americans oppose preferences while supporting "affirma-
tive action." Gary Langer, Assistance, But Not Pre[lffence Poll: Most Share Bush s View on 
Affirmative Action Analysis, available at http:/ /www.abcnews.com (Jan. 27, 2003). 
92 See infra text accompanying notes 110-17 (describing the political developments 
that caused the Bush administration's embrace of racial diversity in higher education). 
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of affirmative action, however, was far more lopsided than this four-to-
one ratio. Consider the following: no member of Congress opposed 
the University. Indeed, one hundred twenty-four members of the 
House and thirteen Senators joined four briefs supporting the univer-
sity, which emphasized that the federal government had repeatedly 
endorsed race-conscious decision making as constitutional, and ar-
gued that the Court should give deference to the constitutionally sig-
nificant opinions of the other branches.93 Though all brief signers 
were Democrats, four moderate Republicans made public their sup-
port of the university. In a letter to President Bush, Senators Lincoln 
Chafee, Olympia Snowe, Susan Collins, and Arlen Specter urged the 
administration to "support the position that diversity is a compelling 
government interest."94 
States also rallied behind the University. Unlike earlier challenges 
to the constitutionality of state-sponsored affirmative action (where 
states typically did not file briefs),95 twenty-three states and the Virgin 
Islands joined one of three briefs supporting the university. 96 These 
briefs argued that the university's determination that a diverse student 
body is a compelling interest that "falls within the institutional auton-
omy afforded to universities . . . and should, therefore, be afforded 
deference.',97 Only one state, Florida, filed a brief supporting the peti-
93 Brief of Amici Curiae John Conyers, Jr., Member of Congress et al. at 24, Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) 
(Nos. 02-241 & 02-516); Brief of Amici Curiae Senators Thomas Daschle et al, at 22, 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) 
(Nos. 02-241 & 02-516). 
94 Letter from Senator Arlen Specter et al. to President Bush (Jan. 14, 2003), 
available at http:/ /www.senate.gov/ -specter /index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases. 
Detail&PressRelease_id=329&Month=1&Year=2003; see also Dana Milbank, Bush's Con-
servative Policies Put Some Moderates on Edge, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2003, at AS (mention-
ing the moderate Republican's letter). 
95 In Bakke, no state filed an amicus brief. In M)•gant, one amicus brief was filed on 
behalf of six states. Brief of Amici Curiae of the State of Minnesota et al. at l, Wygant 
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1985) (No. 84-1340). In Croson, two briefs 
were filed on behalf of sixteen states and the District of Columbia. Brief of Amici Cu-
riae of the State of New York et al. at 1, City of Richmond v. Croson, l 09 S. Ct. 706 
(1988) (No. 87-998); Brief of Amicus Curiae of the State of Maryland at 1, City of 
Richmond v. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1988) (No. 87-998). 
96 California and Washington, the two states bound by citizen initiatives prohibit-
ing racial preferences joined these briefs. Brief of Amici Curiae of the State of Mary-
land et al. at 5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. 
Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516). 
97 Brief of Amicus Curiae Michigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm at 5, Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger 123 S. Ct. 241 1 (2003) (Nos. 
02-241 & 02-516); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Maryland, supm note 96, at 5, 
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tioner. In it, Florida argues that diversity can be pursued without ra-
cial preferences, and points to its own experiences with a race-neutral 
admissions scheme, which includes a program whereby the top twenty 
percent of high school seniors are guaranteed admission to state uni-
versities. 98 
Big-business, labor, education, and civil-rights interests also 
backed the university. While these interests had all embraced the 
constitutionality of racial preferences prior to the Michigan cases, 
support for the Michigan plans was more emphatic than it had been 
in earlier affirmative action cases. Ninety-one colleges and universi-
ties, as well as every major educational association, filed briefs in sup-
port of the university. Not one college or university filed a brief op-
posing affirmative action.99 These briefs argued that "pluralistic, 
widely representative" colleges provide a more enriching learning en-
vironment and better preparation for life in a multiracial world/00 and 
that a racially integrated student body is "critical to American democ-
racy" because, among other things, a significant number of high-
ranking public officials are graduates of elite colleges and universi-
(arguing that Bakke harmonizes equal protection, academic freedom and federalism by 
"giving a degree of deference to a public university's academic decisions, within consti-
tutionally prescribed limits"). 
98 Brief of Amici Curiae of the State of Florida and the Honorable John Ellis 'Jeb" 
Bush, Governor at 17-18, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollin-
ger 123 S. Ct. 24ll (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516). Briefs supporting the university, 
however, took issue with Florida's claim. A brief filed by a coalition of twenty-one 
states and the Virgin Islands called attention to news reports that "[a]ides to Gov. Jeb 
Bush of Florida admit that they settled on the 20-percent standard after computer 
models of 10-percent and 15-percent policies failed to produce enough black and His-
panic students." Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Maryland, supra note 97, at 26 (quot-
ing Jeffrey Selingo, What States Aren't Saying About the "X-Percent Solution," CHRON. OF 
HIGHEREDUC.,June 2, 2000, atA31). 
99 Whereas in Bakke, five briefs were filed on behalf of eight educational associa-
tions, colleges, and universities. Brief of Amicus Curiae Antioch School of Law, Re· 
gents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-8ll); Brief of 
Amici Curiae Board of Governors of Rutgers, et al., Regents of University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811); Brief of Amici Curiae Columbia Uni-
versity, et al., Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 ( 1978) (No. 76-
811); Brief of Amici Curiae the State of Washington and the University of Washington, 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811); Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Howard University, Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-8ll). 
100 Brief of Amici Curiae Amherst College et a!. at 7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. 
Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516). See 
also Brief of Amici Curiae American Education Research Association et al. at 4-15, 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 24ll (2003) (No. 02-241) (summarizing research showing 
that diversity in education promotes awareness, tolerance and leadership). 
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ties. 101 Correspondingly, briefs filed by Fortune 500 companies and 
other business interests102 claim that business needs a diverse pool of 
potential employees in order to compete effectively in the global mar-
ketplace. To achieve this diversity objective, schools must be able to 
consider race. 
This emphatic, near-unanimous reaffirmation of affirmative ac-
tion helped propel the University of Michigan affirmative action pro-
grams. Perhaps more significantly, a coalition of former high-ranking 
officers and civilian leaders of the military (including William Crowe, 
Bud McFarlane, Norman Schwarzkopf, and Anthony Zinni) joined 
forces with longstanding supporters of affirmative action. In a brief 
that figured prominently in both oral arguments and the Court's deci-
sion, 103 the "military brief' linked "the military's ability to fulfill its 
principal mission to provide national security" with existing preferen-
tial treatment programs at the nation's military academies and its 
ROTC programs. 104 Noting the problems of low morale and height-
ened racial tension in Vietnam, the brief argued that "a highly quali-
fied, racially diverse officer corps educated and trained to command 
our nation's racially diverse enlisted ranks is essential to the mili-
t [ ] ,105 ar y. 
The amicus curiae filings in Grutter and Gratz are a testament to 
the breadth and intensity of support for affirmative action. 106 By de-
101 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Law Schools at 4, Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241) (urging that "lawyers and judges occupy 
a distinctly powerful and privileged position within the American political system."). 
102 There are six briefs supporting racial preferences from business or business 
organizations (including briefs from sixty-five Fortune 500 Companies and eighteen 
media companies), and all support affirmative action. In contrast, when the Supreme 
Court heard Adamnd v. Peiia in 1995, no briefs were filed by major businesses or non-
minority organizations. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
10
" Consolidated Amicus Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton,Jr. eta!., at 5, Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos. 
02-241 & 02-516)); see alw Linda Greenhouse, justices Look for Nuance in Race-Preference 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at Al (noting that "of the 102 briefs filed in the two 
cases, this was the one that had grabbed the attention of Q]ustices across the [C]ourt's 
ideological spectrum"); infra text accompanying notes 134-43 (describing how the 
"military brief' lent support to the Court's conclusion that informed, respectable in-
terest groups valued racial diversity). 
104 Brief of Lt. Gen. Becton, supra note 103, at 5. For a discussion of how Lee Bol-
linger, then President of the University of Michigan, helped orchestrate the writing of 
this brief, see Lyle Denniston, Military May Sway Court on Diversity, BOSTON GLOBE, June 
22, 2003, at Al. 
105 Brief of Lt. Gen. Becton, supra note 103, at 5. 
106 For a discussion of the impact of such lopsided filings on the Justices, see James 
F. Spriggs II & Paul]. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Infonnation at the Sujmme 
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tailing the perceived benefits of affirmative action, they provided the 
Court with information it could use to explain why racial diversity is a 
compelling government interest. 107 In sharp contrast, opponents of 
affirmative action remained politically isolated. The only notable 
brief that supported this position was an ambiguous filing by the Bush 
administration. 108 But as I will discuss that brief probably did more 
harm to their cause than good. Indeed, when compared to other con-
troversial social issues (abortion or religion in the schools), the ab-
sence of important, powerful voices on one side of the issue seems es-
. 11 k ]()<J peoa y star . 
B. Trent Lott and the Bush Brief 
The biggest boost for affirmative action may have come from an 
unlikely source: George W. Bush. On January 15, 2003, the President 
Court, 50 POL. REs. Q. 365, 377 ( 1997). For a somewhat competing argument, see Jo-
seph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Su-
preme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 830 (2000), which concludes that this "interest 
group model ... finds only equivocal support" and defends, instead, a "traditional le-
gal model" that focuses on whether amici submit legally relevant information to the 
Court that is not already supplied by the parties to the case. In Grutter and Gratz, ami-
cus support for the University of Michigan did provide the Court with legally relevant 
information. See infra text accompanying notes 139-40 (discussing citations to amicus 
filin!?,s in the Court's opinion). 
07 The information contained in amicus briefs, moreover, may have figured into 
the Justices' understanding of whether race diversity is a compelling interest. The mili-
tary brief, for example, provided important information about the possible nexus be-
tween national security and race diversity. Brief of Lt. Gen. Becton, supra note 103, at 5. 
108 Brief of Amicus Curiae Unites States at 1, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 
(2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516). V.'hile 
briefs by the State of Florida and the Asian American Legal Foundation argued that 
the Michigan plans were unconstitutional, see supra note 98 and accompanying text 
(discussing Florida's brief), the Florida brief was obscured by the filings of twenty-
three other states and the Asian American Legal Foundation brief was dwarfed by sixty-
four others submitted on behalf of three hundred organizations supporting the uni-
versity. For a discussion of these organizations supporting the university, see Diana 
Jean Schemo, Doctors, Soldiers and Others Weigh In on Campus Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
23,2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 7. Cf Charles Lane, U-Michigan Gets Broad Support on Using 
Race, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2003, at A1 (noting that opponents of preferences were 
"backed mainly by relatively small conservative public-interest groups"). 
109 Compare, for example, abortion litigation. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv-
ices, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), pro-choice and pro-life interests filed roughly the same num-
ber of amicus briefs. Moreover, important amicus briefs by states, members of Con-
gress, and state lawmakers were filed on both sides of the issue. See Lee Epstein, Interest 
Group Litigation During the &hnquist Court Era, 9 J. LAW. & POL. 639 (1993) (analyzing 
Webster's illustration of how governmental interests sponsor and coordinate cases). For 
additional discussion of these briefs, see Susan Behuniak-Long, Friendly-Fire: Amici Cu-
riae and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 74JUDICATURE 261 (1991). 
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announced that he "strongly support[s] diversity . . . including racial 
diversity in higher education," but that he considered the University 
of Michigan's affirmative action plans to be "[a]t their core" an un-
constitutional "quota system." 110 The very next day, the George W. 
Bush Justice Department submitted a brief that, "far from insisting 
that any consideration of race was impermissible, did not even ask the 
justices to overturn the Bakke decision, ... [instead] allowing race to 
be used as a 'plus factor."' 111 The brief argued that government "may 
not employ race-based means without considering race-neutral alter-
natives and employing them if they would prove efficacious."112 In 
other words, unlike the absolutist filings of the Reagan and first Bush 
administrations, the Bush Justice Department sought to steer a middle 
path on racial preferences. Indeed, following the Court's decisions in 
Grutter and Gratz, the President declared victory, "applaud[ing] the 
Supreme Court for recognizing the value of diversity on our Nation's 
I 13 
campuses." 
The President's decision is readily understandable. On the one 
hand, he could not embrace the University of Michigan's programs 
without alienating his conservative base, represented by Attorney 
General John Ashcroft and Solicitor General Ted Olson.114 On the 
other hand, he could not risk rejecting affirmative action because his 
110 Remarks on the Michigan Affirmative Action Case, 39 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES. 
Doc. 71 (Jan. 15, 2003). 
111 Linda Greenhouse, Muted Call in Race Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at AI 
(quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Unites States, supra note 108, at 5). For this very rea-
son, conservatives castigated the administration for "split[ting] the difference on racial 
preferences" and thereby signaling the Court that "[a] conservative president does not 
think that he can afford to stand unambiguously for colorblindness." Negative Reaction, 
NAT'L. REV., Feb. 10, 2003, at 12. 
112 Brief of Amicus Curiae Unites States, supra note 108, at 9. 
113 Statement on the Supreme Court Decision on the Michigan Affirmative Action 
Cases, 39 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 803 (June 23, 2003). Other high-ranking ad-
ministration officials, including White House counsel Alberto Gonzales and Education 
Secretary Rod Paige, also expressed approval of the decision. See John M. Broder, Ad-
ministration Lawyer Lauds Affirmative Action Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2003, a t AIO 
(referring to Gonzales' approval of the Grutter decision); Press Release, Department of 
Education, Paige Issues Statement on Today's Supreme Court Decisions about Univer-
sity of Michigan's Admissions Policies (June 23, 2003) (noting Rod Paige's support of 
race-neutral policies), available at http:/ /www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2003/06/ 
06232003a.html . 
114 For news stories recounting Ashcroft and Olson's efforts to convince the Presi-
dent to file an absolutist brief against preferences, see Dana Milbank, Bush Aides Split 
on Bias Case at U-Mich., WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2002, at AI; Peter Schmidt, Bush Asks Su-
preme Court to Strike Down U. of Michigan 's Affirmative-Action Policy, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC.,Jan. 24, 2003, at A20. 
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political advisors told him that he must do better with minority voters 
to win reelection.''" Otherwise, growing minority populations, espe-
cially in closely divided states, could undermine his reelection bid."" 
Fears of alienating minority voters were driven home when several 
high-ranking minority appointees expressed their support for affirma-
tive action both during internal deliberations about the Michigan 
d . bl" c 117 cases an 1n pu 1c LOrums. 
Following racially insensitive remarks of then Senate majority 
leader Trent Lott, the President had little choice but to publicly em-
brace racial diversity in higher education (if not the University of 
Michigan plans themselves). In December 2002, Senator Lott ap-
peared to embrace the segregationist appeals of Strom Thurmond's 
1948 presidential campaign.118 The President immediately denounced 
Senator Lott for making statements that "do not reflect the spirit of 
our country" and, at least implicitly, "distanced himself from the Sen-
ate majority leader." 119 When the administration filed its brief in 
January 2003, there was little question that the Lott imbroglio helped 
push the administration towards its middle ground position.120 
11 5 Adam Nagourney, With His Eye on Two Political Prizes, the President Picks His Words 
Carefully, N.Y. TIMES, jan. 16, 2003, at A26. 
116 See Linda Chavez, Don 't Go Wobbly, Mr. Bush!, WALL. ST. j. , Jan. 8, 2003, at Al4 
(noting that "the conventional wisdom among some Republican politicos [is] that op-
posing affirmative action is a sure way to alienate [minority] voters"); Edsall, supra note 
85 (describing Republican worries "that long-term demographic changes ... could re-
sult in major Democratic gains"); Nagourney, supra note 115 (noting that "minority 
populations are expanding in so many closely divided states"). 
117 See Mike Allen, Counsel to an Assertive Presidency, WASH. POST, May 19, 2003, at 
Al7 (discussing White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez's "crucial role in persuading 
Bush ... to call Michigan's system unconstitutional but remain silent on the broader 
question of affirmative action"); David Firestone, From 2 Bush Aides, 2 Positions on Af 
firmative Action Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at Al7 ("Secretary of State Colin L. 
Powell ... made it clear he remained a strong supporter of traditional affirmative ac-
tion."); Michael Getler, Rice, Race and Reporters, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2003, at B6 (quot-
ing National Security Advisor Condolezza Rice's statement that "it is appropriate to use 
race as one factor among others in achieving a diverse student body."); Milbank, supra 
note 114 (noting Gonzalez's opposition to an "administration stance against affirma-
tive action"); Schmidt, supra note 114 (describing Gonzalez's concern about "a stand 
against race-conscious admissions"). 
11 8 Adam Nagourney & Carl Hulse, Divisive Words: The Republican Leader; Bush Re-
bukes Loll Over &marks on Thurmond, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at AI (quoting Senator 
Lott at a party for Senator Thurmond). 
11 9 !d. 
120 See June Kronholz &Jeanne Cummings, Bush Decries Racial Preferences, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 16, 2003, at A4 (noting that "[c]omplicating the political calculation [on af-
firmative action] was the recent rebuke of Sen. Trent Lott"). 
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C. Protecting the Court's Turf 
The political pressures that pushed the Bush administration to 
distance itself from past Republican administrations underscore a 
simple fact: twenty-five years after the Supreme Court signaled that 
race can be "a factor" in college and university admissions, 121 affirma-
tive action has become so entrenched that the costs of taking a stand 
122 
against it are greater now than ever before. For the Supreme Court, 
these same social and political forces call attention to the institutional 
cost of opposing affirmative action. Lacking the power to appropriate 
funds or command the military, the Court understands that it must 
act in ways that gamer public acceptance. 123 A Court decision that is 
ignored or skirted does the Court little good. Likewise, the Court can 
be hurt by a decision that prompts a political backlash. 124 
When deciding Grutter and Gratz, the Justices had reason to be-
lieve that the Court could not stop colleges and universities from de-
vising race-conscious admissions strategies. A brief filed by the Uni-
versity of Texas Law School in a 1996 preferential admissions case 
warned: "If affirmative action is ended, inevitable political, economic 
and legal forces will pressure the great public universities to [find ways 
121 I use the word "signaled" because this feature of Justice Powell's opinion in Re-
gents v. Bakke may well have been dicta. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 
739-42 (6th Cir. 2002) (arguing that Justice Powell's claim that diversity is a compelling 
government interest is a binding precedent), with id. at 785-87 (Boggs,]. dissenting) 
(arguing that Powell's claim is dicta). See also Alan]. Meese, Reinventing Bakke, 1 
GREEN BAG 2d 381, 390 (1998) (concluding that lower courts should not treat Powell's 
claim as binding precedent and should "feel free to reach their own conclusions about 
the ~ropriety of employing racial preferences in the admission process"). 
22 At the time of Bakke, affirmative action was not entrenched. The Carter ad-
ministration, for example, almost filed a brief opposing preferential admissions in 
Bakke. See JOSEPH A. CALIFAl'\10, JR., GOVERNING fu\1ERICA 236-40 (1981) (discussing the 
Justice Department's draft brief, which argued that racial classifications were "pre-
sumptively unconstitutional"). Today it is almost inconceivable that a Democratic ad-
ministration would oppose affirmative action. 
123 This, of course, is why Alexander Hamilton referred to the judiciary as "the 
least dangerous" branch in THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For much the same reason, an empirical study by psy-
chologists Tom Tyler and Gregory Mitchell confirmed that "the public belief in the 
Court's institutional legitimacy ... enhances public acceptance of controversial Court 
decisions." Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discre-
tionmy Legal Autharity: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE LJ. 
703, 715 (1994); see also supra text accompanying note 18 (noting propensity of swing 
Justices to take account of social and political forces). 
124 For additional discussion of how the Court takes account of whether elected 
officials will implement or subvert its decisions, see supra notes 23-26 and accompany-
ing text. 
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to maintain minority enrollments] ." 125 Consider, for example, plans 
guaranteeing admission to the top ten or twenty percent of high 
school seniors. Although ostensibly race-neutral, these plans are de-
signed to ensure that a set percentage of Mrican Americans and His-
panics secure admission to flagship state universities. 126 Another ex-
ample of an ostensibly race-neutral plan designed to boost minority 
enrollment is the UCLA School of Law's creation of a separate admis-
sions procedure for students interested in enrolling in that school's 
Critical Race Studies program. Although this program is open to stu-
dents of all races, this initiative is an example of so-called "proxies" 
used to attract minority students. 127 Other proxies include "greater 
faculty discretion" in admissions decisions and greater attention to 
"socio-economic" status. 128 
A decision repudiating affirmative action, moreover, would have 
fueled Senate Democrat efforts to derail Bush judicial nominees. 
Complaining that the Rehnquist Court engages in "conservative judi-
cial activism," Senate Democrats have argued that the judicial confir-
129 
marion process should be used as a check on the Court. When 
125 Jeffrey Rosen, How I Learned to Love Quotas, N.Y. TIMES, June I, 2003, § 6 
(Magazine), at 52, 54 (quoting the amicus brief to Supreme Court by three University 
of Texas professors). 
126 Since many high schools are racially isolated, these plans guarantee admission 
to minority students who attend predominantly minority schools. See supra text ac-
companying note 98 (discussing Florida's twenty percent plan). Texas's plan has also 
"resulted in a nice increase in minority participation and enrollment at universities 
and post-graduate studies." Milbank, supra note 114 (quoting White House spokesman 
Ari Fleischer in discussion of Texas plan as being devised by Bush when he was that 
state's governor). 
127 See Daniel Golden, Schools Find Ways to Achieve Diversity Without Key Tool, WALL 
ST. J., June 20, 2003, at AI (providing an example of a proxy, namely interest in 
UCLA's Critical Race Studies program). 
128 /d. For example, at the University of California, Berkeley, law school officials 
created a system of "individualized assessment" that enabled them to admit nearly as 
many minority students after a voter-approved anti-affirmative action initiative as be-
fore the initiative's approval. Richard Sander, Colleges Will Just Disguise Racial Quotas, 
L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2003, at Bll. 
129 As I have detailed elsewhere, I think that complaints of "conservative judicial 
activism" have relatively little to do with Democrat disappointment or with Rehnquist 
Court decision making; instead, these complaints are largely a smokescreen for Demo-
crats seeking to repay Republicans for hardball politics over Clinton judicial nominees 
and, more generally, to constrain the Bush White House. See Neal Devins, The Federal-
ism-Rights Nexus: l!.xplaining Why Senate Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision 
Making But Not the Rehnquist Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1307, 1307-09 (2002) (suggest-
ing that the objectors to the Rehnquist Court come from polarization between Repub-
licans and Democrats, and bitterness over the Court's involvement in the 2000 presi-
dential election). 
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Democrats controlled the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2001 and 
2002, a handful of Bush nominees were either rejected or put on hold 
because of their views on civil and abortion rights. 13° Following the 
2002 midterm elections (when Republicans regained control of the 
committee), Senate Democrats have filibustered a number of Bush 
federal court of appeals nominees. 131 
Considering the widespread support for affirmative action in 
Congress and the states, there is little question that a Court decision 
that rejected both of the Michigan plans would have quickly spilled 
over to the confirmation process. By ruling in favor of affirmative ac-
tion (as well as gay rights and family leave protections), the Court 
helped neutralize Senate Democrat complaints. 132 In other words, Jus-
tices who do not strongly disapprove of racial preferences would have 
good reason to steer clear of this controversy, 133 especially since it is 
doubtful that colleges and universities would truly conform to a Su-
preme Court decision calling for color-blind admissions. 
13
° For example, civil rights groups launched a successful campaign against Bush's 
efforts to elevate District judge Charles Pickering to the Fifth Circuit. See Helen Dewar 
& Amy Goldstein, A.ppeals Court Choice Rejected: Senate Panel Hands Bush 1st Defeat on ju-
dicial Nomination, WASH. POST, Mar 15, 2002, at AI (discussing 10 to 9 party-line votes 
in the Senate judiciary Committee). Claims that Pickering displayed "insensitivity and 
hostility" to voting rights, desegregation, and other civil rights reforms, People For the 
American Way, Thanks Senators for opposing Extremist Bush Nominees at http:/ I 
www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=7794 (last visited Oct. 19, 2003), 
prompted Senate Democrats to argue that Pickering would "supplant[] the law with 
his conservative views." Amy Goldstein & Helen Dewar, Democrats Challenge Choice of 
Miss. judge, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at AS. Mter the Republicans regained control of 
the Senate in 2002, President Bush renominated Pickering. Neil A. Lewis, A. judge, a 
Renomination and the Cross-Burning Case That Won't End, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at 
Al6. Senate Democrats then filibustered the nomination. See Neil A. Lewis, Filibuster 
on Nominee to Court Seat Suroives Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at AIO. 
131 See, e.g., id.; Helen Dewar, Nomination of Tex. Judge is Blocked, WASH. POST, May 
2, 2003, at A2 (describing the first two filibustered nominations); RobertS. Greenber-
ger, &trada's Withdmwal May Spur Political Bickering, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2003, at B2 
(discussing Democratic senators' continuing fight to block the nominations of two 
more federal court of appeals nominees, Alabama Attorney General William Pryor and 
Los Angeles Superior Court judge Carolyn Kuhl); Rainbow Filibuster Coalition, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 15, 2003, at A20 (noting that additional nominees "[c]oming up on the filibus-
ter hit parade [are] Henry Saad, ... nominated for the Sixth Circuit ... [and] ... 
Janice Brown, ... nominated for the D.C. Circuit"). 
132 See infra text accompanying note 163 (discussing Congressional approval of the 
Court's ruling). 
'" See Merrill, supra note 31 (noting that O'Connor and Kennedy often vote to 
deny certiorari in cases raising divisive social issues); Thomas & Taylor, supra note 15, 
at 49 (noting that O'Connor "doesn't like to be part of polarizing decisions"). For ad-
ditional discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 24-26. 
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* * * 
When deciding Grutter and Gratz, the Supreme Court paid hom-
age to the majoritarian forces beating against it. 134 Indeed, the Court's 
conclusions about whether and how colleges and universities can take 
race into account are perfectly in sync with social and political forces. 
While a single Justice (Sandra Day O'Connor) is largely responsible 
for the Court's balancing act, the fact remains that six Justices explic-
itly ruled that race-based admissions are constitutionally permissible 135 
(and a seventh, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, sidestepped that 
question) .136 Likewise, six Justices explicitly ruled that both quotas 
and mechanical formulas that award a certain number of points to all 
minority students are unconstitutional 137 (and a seventh, Justice John 
Paul Stevens, sidestepped that question) .138 
The least surprising feature of the Court's rulings is its conclusion 
that racial diversity is a compelling governmental interest. Main-
stream amici (even those, like the Bush administration and State of 
Florida, who thought that the two Michigan programs went too far) 
were unanimous in their embrace of racial diversity. 139 In Orutter, the 
majority relied on these amicus filings and cited briefs by the Bush 
administration, educational associations, colleges and law schools, big 
business, and the so-called "military brief."140 It did not matter that 
134 Indeed, for only the second time in its history, the Court allowed for the live 
broadcast of oral arguments in the case. This decision reflected the Justices recogni-
tion of "the extraordinary public interest" in the case. Eavesdropping on Histary, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at A20. 
135 In addition to Justices O'Connor, Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens (the 
Gruttermajority),Justice Anthony Kennedy reached this conclusion. 123 S. Ct. at 2370 
(Kennedy,J., dissenting). 
136 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2365 (Rehnquist, Chief J., dissenting) (avoiding com-
ment on the constitutionality of race-based admissions, and limiting his opinion only 
to "the limited circumstances when drawing racial distinctions is permissible") (inter-
nal citations omitted). 
137 In addition to Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas 
(the Gratz. majority),Justice Breyer expressed this view in a concurring opinion. 123 S. 
Ct. at 2433-34 (Breyer,J., concurring). 
138 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2434-38 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (remaining silent on the 
merits of the case and arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were no longer ripe). 
139 See supra text accompanying notes 91-107. Of these amici, the State of Florida 
was the only one to explicitly argue that this compelling interest could not be pursued 
through race-conscious admissions programs. See Brief of Amici Curiae of the State of 
Florida, supra note 98 at 4-5. 
140 The Court cited eight amicus briefs in this part of its opinion. Cruller, 123 S. 
Ct.at2336,2340,2341,2345. 
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some of these briefs advanced interests, such as national security, that 
were not advanced by the University. Rather, the Court wanted to 
make clear that racial diversity was compelling, and that informed, re-
spectable interests overwhelmingly supported it. 141 Under these cir-
cumstances, a contrary holding would have been judicial hubris, plac-
ing the Court's views ahead of all others. 142 
For the same reason, it is unsurprising that the Court would find 
that colleges and universities may take race into account. In particu-
lar, once the Bush administration signaled that preferential admis-
sions schemes are sometimes constitutional, majoritarian forces over-
whelmingly supported the Court reaching a similar conclusion. 143 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who had never voted to approve a race-
based preference scheme, undoubtedly saw her approval of preferen-
tial admissions as simply cementing the status quo (with business, 
educational, and elected government interests all backing prefer-
ences).144 More tellingly, the dissenting opinions in Grutterunderscore 
the breadth of support for affirmative action. Not only did swing Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy explicitly embrace race-conscious university 
admissions, Chief Justice Rehnquist never questioned whether race 
can be used in admissions. Instead, his dissent was limited to how the 
law school took race into account. 145 
The real question in Grutter and Gratz was how much latitude 
schools would have when employing race and, relatedly, whether the 
Court would approve one of the University of Michigan plans. As I 
will now explain, the Court's decisions were a picture-perfect reflec-
141 The term "respectable" was used by Bill Van Alstyne when discussing the 
sources of support upon which the Court relied in its opinion. Discussion with Bill 
Van Alstyne, William R. Perkins and Thomas C. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke Law 
School, in Williamsburg, VA (Feb. 2003). 142 Even though the Court's citation to amicus briefs showed that opponents of 
affirmative action were politically isolated, it may also be that these briefs were cited 
because they alerted the Justices to legally relevant information. See supra text accom-
panying note 106 (noting that these briefs gave the Court information it could use in 
formulating its opinion). 143 See supra text accompanying notes 96-101, 109-11 (listing numerous amicus 
briefs submitted in support of allowing race to be used as a factor in college and uni-
versi~ admissions). 
1 4 For a perceptive treatment of O'Connor's embrace of the status quo, see Mi-
chael Klarman, Are Landmark Court Decisions All That Important?, CHRON. HIGHER 
Eouc., Aug. 8, 2003, at B10-ll. 145 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2365 (Rehnquist, Chief J., dissenting) ("I do not be-
lieve, however, that the University of Michigan Law School's ... means are narrowly 
tailored to the interest it asserts .... [T]he Law School's program is revealed as a na-
ked effort to achieve racial balancing."). 
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tion of the social and political forces beating against it. With that said, 
I am not contending that the Court had no choice but to approve one 
of the two Michigan programs. A decision, for example, approving 
some race-based admissions schemes but striking down both plans as 
mechanistic quota-like systems would have reflected social and politi-
cal forces. Such a decision would have appealed to a Justice like An-
thony Kennedy, who found the Michigan plans offensive but still 
wanted to take social and political forces into account. 146 
Nevertheless, social and political forces strongly supported the 
Court's decision to uphold the law school program that purportedly 
provided "meaningful individualized review of applicants,"147 while 
striking down the undergraduate program because it did not consider 
"the particular background, experiences, or qualities of each individ-
ual applicant." 148 A decision striking down both programs-even one 
that recognized that individualized treatment of race is constitution-
ally permissible-would have come at a cost. As previously men-
tioned/49 such a decision might have been portrayed as anti-civil rights 
and spilled over to confirmation politics and the 2004 elections. In 
addition to placing the Court in the middle of a political imbroglio, a 
decision striking down both programs (while recognizing that race di-
versity is a compelling interest) would have clarified very little. In re-
sponse, colleges and universities likely would either come forward 
with new affirmative action plans or new explanations as to why they 
have no choice but to adhere to existing preferential admission pro-
grams.150 Over time, there would be new circuit conflicts and increas-
146 Along the same lines, Justice O'Connor's approval of the law school plan may 
well have been tied to her belief that the Court must work to achieve "both the percep-
tion and the reality of equal justice" because "a substantial number of our citizens be-
lieve our legal judicial system is unresponsive to them because of racial bias." Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks of the Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, Recipient of 
the Honorary Degree Doctor of Laws (May 25, 2003), available at http:/ I 
www.gwu.edu/-media/pressrelea~e.cfm?ann_id=6782; see also Sandra Day O'Connor, 
Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1217 (1992) 
(noting that Marshall's "personal histories and experiences" shaped O'Connor's think-
ing). For additional discussion, see infra note 162 (noting the connection between 
O'Connor's decision in Grutterand relevant social and political forces). 147 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2431 (O'Connor,]., concuning). 
148 ld. 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 114-16, 129-31 (identifYing potential effects 
of a decision against affirmative action). 150 See supra text accompanying notes 125-28 (listing various plans used to main-
tain or increase minority enrollment); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae American Educa-
tion Research Association, supra note 100, at 25-29 (arguing that a school's compelling 
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ing pressure for the Court to issue a more decisive opinion. A deci-
sion upholding the law school program therefore comports with the 
Rehnquist Court's post-1995 practice of shifting its energies away from 
divisive social issues. 151 
'What then can we take from Justice Scalia's claim that the Court's 
qualified approval of racial preferences "seems perversely designed to 
prolong the controversy and the litigation"?152 For Justice Scalia, fu-
ture litigation would examine whether a school's consideration of 
race, in fact, is individualized, and whether the school's expressed 
commitment to diversity is a mere smokescreen to disguise discrimina-
tory admissions. These claims, however, ignore the Court's method-
ology in Grutter and Gratz. Specifically, the Court drew a sharp line 
between admissions systems that purportedly allow for independent 
consideration of each applicant and "nonindividualized [and] me-
chanical" formulae that mandate that all minority applicants be 
placed in a separate admissions pool, be given a specified number of 
bonus points, etc. 153 For the majority, the latter category is clearly im-
permissible, while the former category is subjected to deferential re-
view and is almost certainly permissible. In Grutter, for example, the 
Court "[took] the law school at its word that it would like nothing bet-
ter than to find a race-neutral admissions formula" and that it consid-
ers each applicant's claim that she will add to the school's diversity. 154 
The fact that the law school distinguished among groups of underrep-
resented minorities (preferring Mrican Americans to Hispanics and 
Native Americans) was considered irrelevant. 155 Likewise, the Court 
saw no reason to discuss why it was that the law school seemed to look 
to the percentage of Mrican Americans in its applicant pool in deter-
mining how many admissions offers it would extend to Mrican Ameri-
cans.156 Finally, the Court did not explore why the percentage of 
interest in race diversity can only be pursued through race-conscious admissions 
schemes). 
151 See supra text accompanying note 64 (identifying the Rehnquist Court's denial 
of certiorari to socially divisive cases). 152 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2349 (Scalia,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 153 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2433 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
"'
4 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346. Indeed, the Court accepted the law school's claim 
that it admits nonminority students "who have greater potential to enhance student 
body diversity over underrepresented minority applicants." !d. at 2345. 
155 Chief justice Rehnquist made much of this fact in his dissent. See id. at 2366-67 
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (noting the differences in the "critical mass" of students 
sought from different minority groups). The majority opinion did not respond. 
156 
See id. at 2368-69 ("But the correlation between the percentage of the law 
school's pool of applicants who are members of the three minority groups and the 
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minority offers "at no point fell below 12%, historically defined by the 
Law School as the bottom of its critical mass range." 157 
By granting broad latitude to colleges and universities that employ 
ostensibly individualized admissions systems, Gruttervalidates claims by 
lawmakers and elites about both the importance of race diversity and 
the difficulties schools face when pursuing this end. Majoritarian 
forces did not support the validation of the undergraduate admis-
sions. While elected officials, interest groups, and newspapers over-
whelmingly back preferences, quotas are taboo. 158 More significantly, 
public opinion polls support the placing of limits on affirmative ac-
tion. These polls show that the American people, while supporting 
racial diversity in higher education, oppose racial preferences. 159 
Opinion polls, however, also reveal that the Court has significant lee-
way to decide what kinds of affirmative action are constitutionally 
permissible. For instance, fewer than one in five white voters claimed 
that affirmative action would play a significant role in sorting out their 
presidential preference, 160 and one day after Californians approved an 
anti-affirmative action initiative, an exit poll revealed that neither Re-
publicans nor Democrats would rank affirmative action as one of the 
percentage of the admitted applicants who are members of these same groups is far 
too precise to be discussed as merely the result of the school paying 'some attention to 
the numbers."'). 
157 I d. at 237I (Kennedy,J., dissenting); see also Mark V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court 
and Affirmative Action, AALS NEWSLETTER, Aug. 2003, at I (suggesting that Michigan 
Law School had a "rough target percentage of minorities," and that the school "might 
increase" the weight given to race "to ensure that the target was met"). The majority, 
however, did note that the range of minority students in each class "varied from I3.5 to 
20.1 percent, a range inconsistent with a quota." I23 S. Ct. at 2343. In response, the 
dissenters noted both that the law school monitored the number of minority students 
who accepted its offers, id. at 2372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and, correspondingly, 
that the school could only control who it made offers to, not who enrolled at the law 
school. /d. at 2369 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
158 Even Bill Clinton, a strong advocate of racial preferences, rejected mechanical 
formulas designed to ensure proportionate minority representation. See Lewis, supra 
note 74, at AI (discussing Clinton's withdrawal of Lani Guinier's nomination in re-
sponse to Senate Democrat complaints). Correspondingly, I do not think that the 
Court felt pressure to uphold the college plan because amici, instead of distinguishing 
the two plans, argued that both plans were constitutional. The Court knew that the 
concern of amici was the approval of racial preferences and the granting of wide lati-
tude to colleges and universities in implementing affirmative action programs. This is 
precisely what the Court did and, not surprisingly, amici were oveljoyed by the Court's 
mling. See infra text accompanying notes I67-68 (recounting popular expressions of 
support for the Court's approval of diversity as a permissible goal). 
159 Langer, supra note 91. 
160 Jennifer L. Hochschild, The Stranger Career of Affinnative Action, 59 OHIO ST. LJ. 
997, IOOI (I998). 
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top seven issues facing voters. 161 Thus, Americans would certainly ac-
cept a decision approving some, but not all, racial preferences. The 
question of how much latitude the Court was giving universities simply 
would not register with most voters. 
The Court therefore had strong reason not to give colleges and 
universities a carte blanche to sort out if and when race should be 
taken into account. 162 By upholding the law school's "individualized" 
consideration of race while rejecting the college's across-the-board 
plan, '" [ t] he court comes across as temperate, reflecting the complex-
ity of opinion in the public itself. "'163 Furthermore, knowing that its 
decisions would be embraced by elected officials and opinion leaders, 
the Court (by ruling against the college in the face of widespread ami-
cus support for the college) was able to appear independent and 
countermajoritarian without worrying about possible political repri-
sals. 
CONCLUSION 
Reaction to the Court's approval of race-based preferences, not 
surprisingly, was overwhelmingly positive. The decisions were hailed 
161 /d. 
162 In Grutter,Justice O'Connor recognized the costs of giving colleges and univer-
sities unbounded authority. She notes that schools should, if possible, consider race-
neutral alternatives. See 123 S. Ct. at 2346 ("Universities in other states can and should 
draw on the most promising aspects of these race-neutral alternatives as they de-
velop."). She also concluded her opinion by commenting that it "has been 25 years 
since [Bakke]" and that "25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer 
be necessary to further the interest approved today." /d. at 2346-47. By qualifYing the 
Court's support for affirmative action, O'Connor signaled that her decision to uphold 
the law school program was tied to social and political forces, including her publicly 
expressed concern about the Court's need to improve its image on race issues. See 
O'Connor, Remarks of the Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, supra note 146 (illustrat-
ing O'Connor's opinion on race and the judicial system). 
163 David Von Drehle, Court Mirrors Public opinion, WASH. POST, June 24, 2003, at 
AI (quoting Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Research Center). For Justice 
O'Connor, moreover, this distinction comports with her dissent in Metro Broadcasting, a 
case upholding diversity preferences for minorities. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 
497 U.S. 547, 602 (O'Connor,]., dissenting) (suggesting that O'Connor would support 
a government program sponsoring individualized consideration of race in admissions, 
but not one as broad in its use of race as a qualification as was the one in this case). 
For Justice O'Connor, nonindividualized diversity preferences wrongly assumed that 
all minorities would make similar programming decisions. See id. ("To uphold the 
challenged programs, the Court departs ... from our traditional requirement that ra-
cial qualifications are permissible only if necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling interest.") 
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by the President and his aides/ 64 by every Democratic presidential 
contender,165 by eight of the nine Senators and Representatives who 
spoke about the case on the floor of Congress/66 and by nearly every 
major newspaper. Colleges and university officials likewise embraced 
the rulings, noting that they now "planned to focus on finding ways to 
shield race-conscious admissions policies against future legal chal-
1 ,167 enges. 
The question remains: will the Court's rulings settle the affirma-
tive action wars once and for all (at least with respect to preferential 
school admissions)? Mter all, if social and political forces strongly 
back affirmative action and the Supreme Court has blessed preferen-
tial admissions, it seems as if there is no prospect of an affirmative ac-
tion counterrevolution. Indeed, even though future Supreme Court 
appointees might transform the Rehnquist Court in ways that cannot 
be predicted, the political forces that pushed for the defeat of Robert 
Bork and Republican Party acquiescence to affirmative action will 
probably stand in the way of the Supreme Court's reversal of Grutter. 168 
On the other hand, even though anti-preference ballot initiatives 
stalled in the face of mainstream Republican opposition, it is possible 
that the leaders of this ballot initiative movement will be energized by 
the Court's rulings. 169 Also, affirmative action may fall under the 
1
r.
4 See sources cited supra note 113 (noting reaction of Bush and his appointees). 
165 Democratic candidate comments to the Court's decision can be found in Asso-
ciated Press, Dem's Target: Bush, CHI. TRIB.,June 23, 2003, at 3. 
166 Congressional Record data is based on a search for references to the case im-
mediately after the Court's decision Qune 23-27, 2003). See 149 CONG. REc. H94,5799 
(daily ed.June 24, 2003) (statement of Rep. King); 149 CONG. REc. S94,8432 (daily ed. 
June 24, 2003) (statement of Sen. Durbin); 149 CONG. REC. S95,8548 (daily ed. June 
25, 2003) (statements of Sens. Kennedy and Feingold); 149 CONG. REC. E 97,1386 
(statement of Rep. Clay). 
167 Peter Schmidt, College Leaders Discuss Ways of Preserving Affirmative Actions, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 17, 2003, available at http:/ /www.chronicle.com/ 
daily/2003/07 /2003071702n.htm. 
168 That is not to say that lower court judges will not narrow the decision. Also, it 
is certainly imaginable that, following the 2004 elections, conseJVative interests will 
successfully push both the White House to nominate and the Senate to confirm a Jus-
tice sympathetic to the conseJVative social agenda. Jonathan Groner, Alberto Gonzales: 
A Washington Education, LEGAL TiMES, Mar. 3, 2003, at 12 (describing the mixed opin-
ions of conseJVatives on the possibility of Gonzales as a Supreme Court Justice). If that 
happens, the Court may reflect the growing power of conseJVatives and pursue the so-
cial conseJVative agenda by, among other things, narrowing Grutter. 
169 See V. Dion Haynes, New Battle on Affirmative Action: opponents Plan to Seek Ban 
Via Vote in Michigan, CHI. TRIB.,July 8, 2003, §I, at 5 (noting ongoing effort to put an 
anti-affirmative action initiative on the Michigan ballot). But see Rebecca Trounson & 
Nancy Vogel, The Recall Election, Pr(}jlositions 53 and 54, Both Ballot Measures Go Down in 
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weight of the nation's changing demographics. In particular, with an 
increasingly diverse and ever-growing minority population, there is 
good reason to question the political saliency of affirmative action 
plans that are limited to just a few groups. 170 
In the short run, however, the Court has responded to social and 
political pressures. Its decision, moreover, seems designed to keep 
the Court out of this thicket and return the issue to the states, where 
schools, elected officials, and voter initiatives can sort out the details 
of racial preferences. In so doing, Grutter and Gratz are emblematic of 
the Rehnquist Court's practice of operating within parameters set by 
social and political forces. 
Defeat, Backers Say the Racial Data and Infrastructure Praposals were Lost in the Recall Hys· 
feria, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at A26 (discussing the October 2003 defeat of an anti-
affirmative action initiative in California). 
170 More generally, rising rates of interracial marriage and changing immigration 
patterns suggest that race and ethnicity are "extremely fluid," "increasing[ly] arbi-
trar[y]" constructs. George F. Will, Crude Remedy for a Disappearing Problem, WASH. 
POST, June 24, 2003, at A21. But see Orlando Patterson, Ajji1mative Action: The Seque~ 
N.Y. TIMES, june 22, 2003, at Dll (arguing that political support for affirmative action 
is now tied to limiting preferences for Mrican Americans, Native Americans, and most 
Latinos). 
